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The paper describes the method, amount and composition of public financing of the arts and
heritage services in England during the 1990s. This offers the background to a discussion of how
far the rationale for government financing for such services can rely on arguments derived from
welfare economics. The presence of ‘market failure’ has been widely accepted by successive
governments and their advisers, but attempts to remove it have encountered the familiar problems
of ensuring allocative and technical efficiency when production subsidies are the main policy
instrument. Special attention is devoted to the policy dilemmas that are likely to arise in the years
ahead in the performing arts, heritage and broadcasting.
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The justification for paying particular attention to public financing of the arts,
including heritage and broadcasting, cannot be based on their relative
significance in the public budget. This is soon apparent (see Section III) when it
is realised that, by any acceptable definition, the arts represent less than 1.5 per
cent of total government direct expenditure. Nevertheless, they have a high
profile in public debates on the place of government in influencing the allocation
of resources, which is also reflected in the amount of parliamentary time devoted
to them, particularly if the role of broadcasting in promoting cultural activities is
included. Latterly, too, greater emphasis has been placed on the perceived
economic benefits of the arts as a source of attraction to overseas tourists and of
uncovenanted benefits to urban communities arising from development of
cultural centres. This is demonstrated forcibly in the considerable percentage of
Lottery money now devoted to capital spending on historical artefacts and
refurbishment of theatres and cinemas and even to current expenditure on
cultural goods. It is also recognised in our political structure by the promotion of
the Minister responsible for the arts to Cabinet rank as from 1992.
It may be presumed that the framework for the study of this subject is similar
to that found in the study of government subsidies to producers of goods and
services. One would begin by identifying the relevant sector and the changing
amount and composition of subsidy received from government, perhaps making
comparison with other countries. The rationale of subsidy would then be
discussed. The effects of subsidies would follow standard analysis, duly
incorporating recognition of the principal–agent problem that arises in
government–industry relations. The analysis might then reveal policy issues,
which would enable a judgement to be made on the suitability of the subsidy
methods actually adopted.
That framework can be more or less adhered to, but the picture within it has
to take account of a number of special features about the financing of the arts
and the economic analysis appropriate for the appraisal of cultural policies. Thus
Section II devotes some space to identifying what is to be included in the arts
and to unravelling the complicated skein of transactions between central
government and those bodies responsible for disbursing public funds. Such
matters have an important bearing on the presentation of data on the amount and
composition of funding and on attempted comparisons with funding in other
countries (see Section III). Compared with, say, twenty years ago, public bodies
are now called upon to produce reasoned arguments and not merely patrician
effusions justifying their claims for funding, and economic analysis has begun to
penetrate statements of their rationale. Welfare economics forms a convenient
framework for presenting such statements and for summarising an important
element in professional economics discussion of arts questions (see Section IV).
With this descriptive and analytical background, an attempt is made to appraisePublic Financing of the Arts
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official attempts to achieve a satisfactory allocation of resources and efficiency
in resource use, special attention being paid to the principal–agent problem in
circumstances in which the agents are largely non-profit-making concerns
(Sections V and VI). Three issues are selected for discussion of the future of
public spending on the arts — the ‘cost disease’ and the performing arts, the
controversy over heritage preservation, and public service broadcasting and the
arts (Section VII). Finally, Section VIII attempts to identify the major
conclusions reached.
II. THE SCOPE OF EXPENDITURE ON THE ARTS
1. Definitional Problems
What is to be included in the arts? I avoid a direct answer to this question by
presenting the ‘stylised facts’ of the recent history of the arts identified for
subsidisation by government. At least since the Second World War, after the
establishment of the Arts Council of Great Britain, well known as the brainchild
of Keynes, it was accepted as the task of government to support cultural
activities represented by the creative arts and their performance or presentation
in the theatre, concert-hall, opera-house, museum or gallery and as heritage
artefacts. Complementary to this support would be some investment in arts
education, not only in order to continue the flow of creative artistic activity but
also to encourage artistic appreciation. This approach embodied an important
value judgement — namely, that individuals would increase their welfare if they
invested in knowledge that would ‘improve their taste’ and were encouraged to
take seriously the professional views of cognoscenti in arriving at their
purchasing decisions — for example, by reading reviews, by attending lectures,
by participation in amateur orchestras and play and painting groups, and as
voluntary helpers in artistic ventures. The more idealistic supporters of this
approach, Keynes included, envisaged that, at some time in the future, current
funding could be gradually reduced as the change in individual tastes for the arts
moved demand curves to the right.
1
The aim of improving the quality of individual choices implied that the
definition was too tightly drawn. There were soon complaints about the
exclusion of popular art forms, not only because of their immediate appeal but
also as a point of entry for the appreciation of more demanding artistic
presentations. The recent history of the evolution of government support could
be written as the translation of ‘the arts’ into ‘culture’, with the latter term
embracing a much wider range of ‘products’, of which the cinema, literature and
crafts are the prime examples. The culmination of this process has been reached
in the contemporary emphasis on ‘social inclusion’ — that is to say, the
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widening of the appeal of the arts not only through broadening the base of
support to non-traditional art forms, including folk arts, action-type heritage
displays, jazz and pop music, but by emphasis on active participation in art
events.
2 In short, the definition of the arts is liable to frequent change and
reflects the important role played by arts pressure groups attempting to influence
the amount and composition of funding.
2. The Administrative Mechanism
The Department of Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) is the principal source of
central government funding of the arts. It continues the tradition of ‘arm’s
length’ organisation of support, by which funds are transferred to a range of
disparate bodies with titles of differing degrees of grandeur, from Commissions
and Councils to mere Boards, whose members are primarily those identified as
arts cognoscenti who in turn are advised by experts in its various branches. The
historical origins of these bodies resulted in a confusion of administrative
command structure which involved several government departments as well as
local authorities and private educational and cultural charities, but this has been
simplified by bringing the major organisations responsible for the distribution of
funds under the aegis of the DCMS. The DCMS now makes Funding
Agreements principally with non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs), in an
endeavour to see that NDPBs’ plans conform with its general funding strategy
and follow agreed methods of assessment of their efficiency and effectiveness.
One interesting result is that the DCMS has control over something like 700
public appointments and makes what is probably the reasonable claim that
selection is based mainly on merit and that the system is now more open and
transparent. Whether that is an effective modus operandi is considered later (see
Section V).
This system would appear to be simple enough if grants were made by the
DCMS to those directly concerned with producing arts services, but this is far
from being the case. National museums and galleries are directly funded, but
bodies such as the Arts Council, the Museums and Galleries Commission and
English Heritage themselves decide on the allocation of funds to arts clients.
Some NDPBs receive considerable amounts of private funding, whereas some
private (normally non-profit-making) producers of arts services are highly
dependent on public funding. A schematic representation may give some idea of
the complications of the administrative process (see Table 1).
The inevitable result of these complications is that dissatisfied clients of
NDPBs who are disbursers of funds may adopt the practice of trying to subvert
the authority of their funding supplier by various subterfuges, such as lobbying
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TABLE 1
Funding of Arts and Heritage
Funding source Funding body Funding allocator Principal clients
Treasury MoD MoD Regimental museums


























National Trust National Trust Historic homes
Local taxation and
charges
Local governments Local government Local museums and
galleries
Local libraries
Note: Excludes central government grants to local authorities on which their cultural services may depend, and
excludes charges and subscriptions paid directly by the public to providers of arts and heritage services.
Source: Constructed from DCMS (1999a).
MPs, appealing directly to the Secretary of State of the DCMS and public
‘exposure’ of what they regard as arbitrary action. They exploit their
comparative advantage in articulate and persuasive rhetoric, and are often
successful — the Covent Garden case comes to mind.
3
3. Finance
The DCMS is exchequer-funded, like other major government departments, and
expenditure on the arts eventually emerges as direct current or capital grants and,
occasionally, loans to (normally) artistic organisations which are usually
registered as charitable corporations and therefore non-profit-making and which
employ artists and professional and administrative staff of all kinds. The precise
legal form of such corporations differs but the fact that they are not normally
profit-making has an important bearing on the motivation of those who control
them and on how their degree of discretion in using funds conforms or conflicts
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with the expressed desire of the DCMS and other funding sources to achieve
effectiveness and efficiency in their use. That is a matter for later discussion (see
Section VI).
The financing problem is complicated by the relative importance of
government sources of finance other than that provided by the DCMS. It is a
moot point whether or not the BBC should be included in the enumerative
definition of the arts, although clearly the DCMS regards it as ‘a focal point for
the identity and culture of the nation’.
4 The size of operation of the BBC
crucially depends on the TV licence fee, a compulsory levy on TV sets, although
latterly the BBC has generated a considerable amount of income from
commercial activities. In 1997–98, the BBC’s total income approached £2.5
billion, with licence fee income representing just over £2 billion. Even if one
maintained that only 15 per cent of this income represented support of artistic
performances comparable with those included in our definition, at £375 million
this would add a large chunk to the total funding.
The National Lottery adds an even more complicated dimension. The funds
available for distribution to ‘good causes’, including the arts, are a function of its
popularity, and certainly the current amount of about £4 million a day suggests
that the Lottery managers should reach the agreed target by 2002. Sixteen per
cent of the share of proceeds is earmarked for arts, sports, charities and national
heritage. Originally, funding was confined to capital projects on a co-funding
basis, but the present government extended the terms of reference to include
current funding. The distributing bodies for the arts (including heritage) have
been the Arts Council and the Heritage Lottery Fund. The sums used or
distributed by these bodies have become substantial.
Both of these methods of funding involve a direct financial link with the
public, but that does not make these bodies any more responsive to the public’s
views on how the funds should be used as compared with representation to MPs
or direct lobbying. Whether a more direct link should be forged and how is
another question worthy of further investigation.
One must also not forget the role of local authorities in promoting the arts.
That this was perceived as important is demonstrated by post-war legislation that
empowered local authorities to raise up to a 6d rate for the purpose of support of
the arts, though this provision was abandoned in 1971. Although the Arts
Council distributes funds to Regional Arts Boards, local authorities play a much
more important role in a funding sense, provided that one is prepared to assign
their library services to the category of expenditure on the arts. Many of them
manage important art galleries and museums, and library services are frequently
one of the major items of expenditure. This may be observed in Table 2 later.
Finally, mention should be made of the alternative of tax relief as a
government-supported method of helping the arts. Corporate sponsorship and
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donations can qualify for tax relief, though not applied to gifts in kind, and by
the mid-1990s represented about 10 per cent of arts sector income. A particular
feature of this method was the pairing scheme instituted in 1984 by which
business support was matched by awards from government. By 1994–95, the
level of sponsorship raised by this means was £13.66 million, of which two-
thirds came from business, but this total is a relatively low component of total
business sponsorship — about 8 per cent. A naïve view of recording support for
the arts would entail adding proceeds from tax relief to the positive contributions
by government, but this begs a number of important questions about the impact
of this tax relief and whether it would represent a net increase in arts funding
corresponding to the recorded amount, not to speak of other effects that tax relief
will entail if the lost revenue has to be made up by other tax adjustments or
balanced by expenditure reductions elsewhere.
5
4. Regulation
The influence of government on the arts is not confined to financial measures.
Regulation offers an alternative way of making historical artefacts available for
public enjoyment. The identification of buildings, monuments and sites of
‘national importance’ is carried out by the Royal Commission on Historical
Monuments for England and Wales, covering both publicly and privately owned
properties. By 1998, no fewer than 600,000 archaeological sites had been so
identified with the aim, by 2003, of protecting 45,000 of them. Some half a
million buildings are protected — buildings including anything from historic
homes to walls and even early telephone boxes — though restrictions on their
alteration or demolition, if rigorously enforced, cover something like 6 per cent
of them. Movable artefacts are covered by the Treasure Act 1996, which
effectively nationalises discoveries of gold and silver relics, leading to disputes
over the compensation to be paid to discoverers. Exports of works of art require
a licence from the DCMS as a means of checking whether efforts should be
made to purchase them in the public interest before they disappear abroad.
The plethora of institutions and authorities concerned with arts provision by
government is compounded by that very British institution, the National Trust
for England and Wales. It is the largest British charity and largest English
landowner, including in its patrimony 164 historic homes and 19 castles, making
it a sizeable part of the heritage system. Although a private charitable
corporation, the Trust made a deal with government almost a hundred years ago,
with the passage of the National Trust Act of 1907, by which its properties
became inalienable and therefore cannot be sold nor be acquired compulsorily by
the state against the wishes of the Trust. In return, the Trust holds its assets for
the benefit of the nation and not for its members. This arrangement has
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encouraged owners to donate properties, in the expectation that they will be
preserved and available for public enjoyment in perpetuity. It has also
encouraged successive governments to give the Trust financial assistance or tax
concessions over and above those normally available to charities.
6
The final element in regulation of the arts is of growing importance — the
government interest in the law of copyright which affects the returns of creative
artists in respect of both the publication and performance of musical works and
the sale of the products of artefacts. This is primarily the concern of the
Department of Trade and Industry, but the DCMS has a particular interest in
intellectual property of what it now describes as ‘the creative industries’. It is
closely involved in the discussions at national and international level over the
determination of the scope of copyright material and how to protect it from the
growth in piracy through CD and video recordings and the Internet. At the same
time, these rights must be balanced against the rights of those who use copyright
material, who can be at a disadvantage in bargaining with agencies collecting
royalties.
7 An interesting illustration of the issues involved is to be found in the
UK government’s dispute with some members of the European Union which are
pressing for a royalty right of resale which would entitle an artist and his or her
heirs to a percentage of the price received when works are resold. It is claimed
that artists would not benefit from this droit de suite because this right would be
likely to reduce the price of original sale and that purchasers and art dealers
would seek out markets in countries that do not recognise the right.
8 A
compromise agreement seems likely to emerge.
III. PUBLIC FUNDING
The analysis of public funding of the arts in any meaningful way should start
with the construction of a matrix in which the flow of funds between the
suppliers, allocators, spenders and users of funds can be traced. This primary
requirement cannot be met as the practical complications of data discovery,
collection and interpretation are too great, and recourse has to be made to more
conventional presentations.
9 Worse still, while it is possible to illustrate trends in
funding in a general way, using DCMS and Treasury data, this is barely possible
in the case of other indicators of interest, such as international comparisons, so
that one is left with point estimates.
                                                                                                                                   
6For an original and exhaustive discussion of the place of the Trust in heritage policy, see Sawers (1998).
7For further discussion, see MacQueen and Peacock (1995) and Towse (1997b).
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suite in Solow (1998).
9Earlier attempts by the author and Christine Godfrey to interest the then Central Statistical Office in
presentation of cultural data only reached the stage of being allowed space in an early number of Social Trends
(Peacock and Godfrey, 1972). I have tried to construct a matrix for the heritage sector, but the data are shaky
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Table 2 records the cash plans for the relevant NDPBs together with
estimates of local authorities’ spending covering the period 1993–94 to 1998–99.
It demonstrates the relative unimportance of expenditure on the arts within total
government expenditure and as a percentage of England’s GDP (compare row 7
with rows 8 and 9). There is a small but perceptible rise in the relative position
of the arts in later years, probably as a result of Lottery funding.
10 Expenditure in
cash terms will rise in the immediate future, but this is not likely to represent
                                                                                                                                   
10It was feared that Lottery funding would be used by the government as a substitute for exchequer funding —
the so-called additionality issue. The matter was considered by the House of Commons Committee on Culture,
Media and Sport in 1998 and the Treasury in evidence denied this. However, it is not known what the level of
exchequer funding would otherwise have been in the absence of Lottery funding, so the matter remains
unresolved.
TABLE 2
Direct Expenditure on the Arts in England
a
Millions of pounds
1993–94 1995–96 1997–98 1999–00 2001–02
1. Museums and galleries
(a) Central government 221 219 205 220 246
(b) Local authorities 119 131 138 136 136
2. Historic buildings 164 164 156 148 142
3. Broadcasting and media
b 85 98 43 104 105
4. Arts
c 235 200 196 230 253
5. Libraries
(a) National libraries 114 171 104 96 93
(b) Local government libraries 586 622 607 658 658
Total current expenditure 1,524 1,605 1,449 1,592 1,633
6. Capital expenditure
(a) Arts Lottery Fund — — 73 73 73
(b) Local authorities
(i) Museums and galleries 25 23 31 25 25
( i i )  L i b r a r i e s 2 92 53 02 42 4
7. Total direct expenditure 1,578 1,653 1,583 1,714 1,755
8. 7 as a % of direct expenditure
of public authorities (DEPA)
1.02 1.07 1.11 — —
9. 7 as a % of GDP (England) 0.48 0.47 0.49 — —
aAll figures are cash plans for relevant years. Figures for 2001–02 are estimates.
bLargely direct expenditure on Welsh Channel 4.
cPredominantly grant to the Arts Council of England and therefore for expenditure on performing arts.
Sources: HM Treasury (1999); DCMS (1999a) with revisions for 1999–00 supplied by the DCMS.TABLE 3
Direct Expenditure on the Arts and Museums: Selected Countries
a
Australia, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden, US, UK,
b
1993–94 1993 1993 1995 1994 1993–94 1995 1995–96
1. Arts spending as a % of government
final consumption spending
0.82 1.31 1.79 0.43 1.47 1.02 0.13 0.65
(0.74)
2. Arts spending as a % of GDP 0.14 0.26 0.36 0.07 0.21 0.29 0.02 0.14
(0.16)
3. Arts spending per head (£) 16.4 37.8 56.5 5.6 30.3 37.5 3.8 16.0
(18.9)
aFor detailed notes, see Feist et al. (1998). For problems in ensuring comparability, see text.
bAs it is difficult in individual countries to separate out capital spending, the data in parentheses for the UK include capital spending.
Source: Feist et al., 1998, Table 13.4, p. 166.Public Financing of the Arts
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a further relative increase. In any case, uncertainty attaches to the amount of
Lottery funding forthcoming and to the (as yet unknown) expenditure plans of
local governments.
It is often alleged that arts spending per head in the UK is well below the
standard expected in high-income countries. It is very difficult to offer precise
evidence for this assertion. As Feist et al. (1998) show, in making international
comparisons, definitional problems arise of the kind already referred to in
Section II and point estimates only are possible. Table 3 shows that there are
wide variations between countries in respect of arts spending both as a
percentage of GDP and per head. This table can only be regarded as a useful
point of departure for a full examination of funding methods, which is beyond
the scope of this paper, and contains the clear warning that public intervention
cannot be measured in terms of expenditure data alone. Even confining attention
to budgetary measures, the influence of tax relief measures, while having a
tangible effect in the UK, is a major influence on art spending in the US.
One can measure the impact of public funding of the arts on those meant to
benefit from them in a general way, but then only for recent years when NDPBs
have been expected to develop sensible performance indicators (PIs). The
problem of PIs is considered in detail in Section VI, but one can offer a general
picture of the utilisation of arts expenditure through the use of data on audiences
for performances and on visitors to heritage sites.
Table 4 concentrates on the performing arts. The Arts Council of England
(ACE) imposes what is, by international standards, a rigorous test of financial
targeting in expecting the performing arts organisations to raise about 50 per
cent of their current income from sources other than grants from ACE and local
authorities. In recent years, as Table 4 indicates, this target has been reached,
broadly speaking. In the case of music and drama companies in receipt of ACE
grants, this target has been met by earned income (largely box-office receipts)
alone, whereas dance companies have had to rely on generating a larger
proportion from ‘other income’, such as donations and sponsorship, in order to
reach the target. Feist (1998) notes that, in 1996–97, US and English orchestras
raised about the same proportion of income from earned income (US: 59 per
cent; UK: 61 per cent) but contributed income (donations, sponsorship,
foundation income etc.) represented 35 per cent in the US and 9 per cent in the
UK, implying that public support in the US was negligible. In contrast, in the
same year, the German public theatres, which present a wide range of operas,
plays, dance and concerts, derived only 13.8 per cent of their income from
earned income, practically nothing from central government funding and over 80
per cent roughly equally divided between the Länder (states) and Gemeinden
(local governments). Another feature of Table 4 is the use of the crude general
measure of audience numbers to illustrate utilisation of arts services. Along with
virtually static direct state funding have appeared static and declining audience
numbers, but the more striking feature is the relatively low ACE grant per capitaFiscal Studies
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for drama and relatively high audience numbers, which are over double those for
dance and music. I have no supplementary data that would enable one to probe
these differences in detail, but a reasonable guess is that the national companies
in receipt of 36 per cent of ACE total funding in 1998 (see Table 6 later) are
more heavily represented in music and dance than in drama alongside non-
national companies.
TABLE 4
Public Funding and Utilisation of Performing Arts Services
Art form 1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98
Music
Earned income (£m) 63.87 (48.8%) 63.48 (49.2%) 66.10 (50.3%) 65.0 (47%)
Government grants (£m)
(a) Arts Council of England 44.88 (34.3%) 45.57 (35.3%) 46.13 (35.1%) 54.0 (39%)
(b) Local authorities 6.50 (5.0%) 6.38 (5.0%) 7.10 (5.4%) 6.6 (5%)
Other income (£m) 15.53 (11.9%) 13.55 (10.5%) 12.27 (9.3%) 11.7 (9%)
Total (£m) 130.78 128.98 131.60 137.3
Audience numbers (millions)
a 2.53 2.59 2.63 2.81
ACE grant per capita (£) 17.7 17.5 17.5 19.1
Dance
Earned income (£m) 21.09 (39.7%) 19.91 (38.6%) 19.02 (36.9%) 21.5 (38%)
Government grants (£m)
(a) Arts Council of England 23.02 (43.3%) 26.61 (51.6%) 24.54 (47.6%) 28.7 (50%)
(b) Local authorities 2.41 (4.5%) 2.34 (4.5%) 2.60 (5.1%) 2.6 (5%)
Other income (£m) 6.62 (12.5%) 4.70 (9.1%) 5.35 (10.4%) 3.4 (6%)
Total (£m) 53.14 53.56 51.52 56.2
Audience numbers (millions)
a 1.39 1.24 1.16 1.11
ACE grant per capita (£) 16.5 21.5 21.1 25.9
Drama
Earned income (£m) 77.60 (53.8%) 71.83 (50.9%) 72.16 (49.8%) 66.7 (49%)
Government grants (£m)
(a) Arts Council of England 44.26 (30.7%) 44.29 (31.4%) 46.44 (32.0%) 45.3 (34%)
(b) Local authorities 18.08 (12.6%) 19.02 (13.5%) 19.17 (13.2%) 15.4 (11%)
Other income (£m) 4.16 (2.9%) 6.00 (4.2%) 7.22 (5.0%) 7.5 (6%)
Total (£m) 144.10 141.14 144.99 134.9
Audience numbers (millions)
a 7.72 6.81 6.86 6.00
ACE grant per capita (£) 5.7 6.5 6.8 7.5
aLive performances only.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages of the total.
Sources: Up to and including 1996–97 — Arts Council of Great Britain Annual Reports; 1997–98 — Arts
Council of England (ACE) Statistical Report No. 2.Public Financing of the Arts
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TABLE 5
Central Government Funding and Utilisation of Selected Arts Organisations




Grant-in-aid (£m) 34.3 33.2 33.9 34.7 (34.9)
Grant-in-aid as a % of total income 73.3 72.2 73.4 75.6 (61.8)
Visits (millions) 6.4 6.5 5.5 5.0 (5.4)
Grant per visitor (£) 5.3 5.1 6.2 6.9 (6.5)
Imperial War Museum
Grant-in-aid (£m) 11.3 10.7 10.6 10.8 (11.3)
Grant-in-aid as a % of total income 55.6 44.5 40.6 35.0 (31.1)
Visits (millions) 1.3 1.3 1.4 1.4 (1.4)
Grant per visitor (£) 8.9 8.2 7.7 8.0 (8.1)
Natural History Museum
Grant-in-aid (£m) 27.6 27.5 27.0 29.6 (28.9)
Grant-in-aid as a % of total income 73.6 62.6 64.9 71.0 (72.1)
Visits (millions) 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.7 (1.7)
Grant per visitor (£) 16.8 15.2 14.2 17.9 (17.5)
Science Museum
Grant-in-aid (£m) 21.9 20.6 20.3 24.6 (21.8)
Grant-in-aid as a % of total income 77.9 65.6 42.8 49.9 (68.8)
Visits (millions) 2.5 2.5 2.2 2.7 (3.1)
Grant per visitor (£) 8.7 8.1 9.2 9.1 (7.0)
British Library
Grant-in-aid (£m) 80.4 84.3 81.5 80.8 (86.2)
Grant-in-aid as a % of total income 71.8 71.4 65.1 69.4 (71.0)
Visits (millions) 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.5 (0.5)
Grant per visitor (£) 174.0 177.5 193.6 161.6 (159.6)
English Heritage
Grant-in-aid (£m) 104.5 107.6 102.4 114.1 (112.2)
Grant-in-aid as a % of total income 90.2 81.3 77.5 78.7 (78.3)
Visits (millions) n.a. 9.8 11.0 11.2 (11.5)
Grant per visitor (£) n.a. 11.0 9.3 10.3 (9.8)
National Gallery
a
Grant-in-aid (£m) 18.2 18.7 18.7 19.2 (19.9)
Grant-in-aid as a % of total income 76.8 55.3 61.3 62.1 (69.6)
Visits (index) 100.0 114.0 109.0 110.0 (110.0)
aThe National Gallery provides no estimates of annual number of visitors but only an index. An estimate of
‘between 4 and 5 million visitors per annum’ is quoted but this estimate is not traceable in the visits index. If 4
million is a reliable estimate for 1994–95, then the grant per visitor could be estimated at £4.5 in that year.
Sources: DCMS, 1999a; forward estimates supplied by the DCMS.Fiscal Studies
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In Table 5, an attempt is made to provide similar data for English Heritage,
the British Library and a sample of the national museums and galleries. Using
the ratio of central government funding to total income as a PI, one notes that the
ratio is higher than for the performing arts. It has been deliberate policy to try to
increase earned income, but future policy is complicated in the case of museums
and galleries by the controversy over admission charges, which may result in
their abolition, at least for children and retired persons. Again in recent years,
using subsidy per visitor as a PI, individual institutions display remarkably little
change, even in cash terms, but there are pronounced variations between them.
While these data may be interesting in themselves, they must form the point of
departure for wider penetration into the meaning and significance of PIs. To take
one striking example, one can well imagine the Trustees of the British Library
hitting its high roof at the very idea that its volume of output should be measured
merely by reader visits unweighted by the number of documents consulted and
without taking account of its obligations to act as a ‘library of last resort’ for all
other libraries in the country.
11
The issue of the distribution of the benefits of grant-in-aid is one of some
political sensitivity because it is generally concluded from available data that
there are pronounced inequities in the distribution of grant-in-aid according to
social class and region.
12 Even if one accepts that placing subsidy per capita
alongside distribution data is a very crude way of demonstrating the final
incidence of subsidies and that possible ‘spillover benefits’ may be generated,
calculations of the first impact of subsidies in this way show up differences that
point towards the necessity for a careful analysis of the rationale of a subsidy
policy that perpetuates them.
The Arts Council data provided on this issue reflect this sensitivity, and only
recently was it decided to publish data on its regional spending per capita. These
data are displayed in Table 6 and confirm the popular view that London benefits
to a greater extent than any other region, even before account is taken of the
location of the national companies, the expenditure on which is ‘unallocated’.
This makes the table a bit of a nonsense, given that their total grants represent 36
per cent of the total. At least the fiction of equality of benefits from such
companies is not perpetuated by allocating their expenditure on an equal per
capita basis per region!
                                                                                                                                   
11It has been claimed that the visitor numbers of museums and galleries that allow free admission cannot
provide accurate checks. There is therefore a natural tendency to exaggerate them! (See Discussion following
my Keynes Lecture to the British Academy (Peacock, 1994).) In DCMS (1999a, p. 106), no visitor numbers are
given for individual years for the National Gallery; only an index of growth is given. There is a mysterious
parenthetical observation that ‘the number of visits is estimated to be between 4 and 5 million per annum’.
12For a thorough analysis of this issue and an examination of data that supports this conclusion for the early
1990s, see Towse (1994).Public Financing of the Arts
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TABLE 6
Arts Council of England Per Capita Spending by Region
Region Total grants Total grants per capita
(£m) (£)
1998 1998 1996–97 1995–96 1994–95
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Eastern 8.2 1.40 1.39 1.41 1.34
East Midlands 7.0 2.05 2.04 2.25 2.18
London 27.4 3.91 4.06 4.01 3.96
Northern 9.7 3.14 2.89 3.20 3.03
North West 16.4 2.53 2.49 2.42 2.49
Southern 10.9 2.30 2.19 2.26 2.05
South East 5.1 1.24 1.28 1.31 1.34
South West 8.7 2.24 2.31 2.37 2.29
West Midlands 10.5 1.97 1.90 1.95 1.88
Yorkshire & Humberside 12.8 2.54 2.54 2.70 2.17
Sub-total 116.7 2.39 2.37 2.43 2.32
National companies 64.9 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33
Total 181.6 3.71 3.71 3.76 3.65
Notes: Column (1) is the total direct spending in 1998 by the ACE in each region either directly or through the
Regional Arts Boards.
The figures for ‘National companies’ cover grants awarded in 1996–97 to the national companies (Royal
Shakespeare Company, Royal Opera House, English National Opera, Royal National Theatre and the South
Bank Board).
Source: Arts Council of England, Annual Reports.
TABLE 7
Percentage of Adult Population Claiming to Attend Arts Events, Museums,
Galleries and Historic Homes, 1996–97
Percentage Subsidy per capita










Classical music 12.3 5.9
Opera 6.5 31.1
Ballet 6.5 21.1
aCovers both public and private sector historical sites.
bOnly applies to English Heritage.
cIncludes national galleries and private galleries receiving subsidies, e.g. through the Museums and Galleries
Commission.
dEstimate based on data for national museums.
Sources: Percentages from Towse (1994) and ACE (1998, p. 12). Subsidy per capita from DCMS (1999a) and
ACE Statistical Report No. 2.Fiscal Studies
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More revealing would be a more comprehensive list of arts organisations
covering the whole of the arts, as defined here, which compared arts attendances
by type of service with utilisation according to income group and social class.
Table 7 is the best that can be done for a recent year, 1996–97.
13 It shows the
proportions of the adult population claiming to visit museums, galleries and
historic homes and to attend concerts and stage performances. These are
compared with the expenditure per capita, so far as this can be identified.
Historic homes turn out to be the most popular venue, followed by museums,
with opera and ballet at the other extreme. If the data on the utilisation by social
class can still be accepted as a guide, then the least popular art forms — opera
and ballet — not only receive much larger subsidies than others but are
patronised largely by the AB social classes. Given the predilection of the present
government to make the arts widely accessible, altering the balance of funding to
reflect this, in the teeth of the understandable wishes of incumbent companies
and institutions to defend their position, is bound to be difficult to achieve.
IV. THE RATIONALE FOR STATE SUPPORT OF THE ARTS
14
The support that conventional welfare economics can offer for state funding of
the arts turns out to be rather weak, but it does provide a familiar agenda for
discussion. The main issue is whether instances of market failure can be
identified that provide a rationale for the amount and form of public authorities’
expenditure. The argument may be developed as follows:
1.  Spillover benefits to other producers. It is claimed that expenditure on
performing arts benefits other producers through the creation of a cultural
ambience attracting skilled factors of production and, as in the case of
tourism, acts as a loss-leader in attracting business from which other
industries benefit (see DCMS (1999a, pp. 55–7)). The claim assumes that
such benefits cannot be captured other than by public subsidy. For the whole
country, such benefits must be largely pecuniary because any attempt to
realise spillover effects by subsidy benefiting one area would require the
reduction in incomes either by the extra taxation required or by the reduction
on other forms of government expenditure. Pushing the argument any further
would require the introduction of interpersonal or interregional comparisons
of utility. However, even if there were recognisable real benefits, two further
conditions would need to be fulfilled to justify state support. It would have to
be demonstrated, first, that extra inputs of cultural goods would be the most
efficient way to produce the desired result and, second, that beneficiaries
                                                                                                                                   
13See Feist (1998). The latest year for which there appears to be information on the proportion of social classes
attending the various art forms is 1991, based on a survey commissioned by the Arts Council of Great Britain
after some ‘lobbying’ by a few of its members, including the author — see Towse (1994).
14The argument in this section follows closely that developed in Peacock (1998).Public Financing of the Arts
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would have no incentive to negotiate private agreements to support cultural
loss-leaders.
2.  Spillover benefits to consumers. Here a distinction needs to be made between
present generations and future generations. In the case of present generations,
it is claimed that an option value attaches to the arts by which even those who
never attend performances or visit museums and galleries derive satisfaction
from the fact that others enjoy them, notably their friends and family, and
from the prestige that the arts confer on their community or country. (For a
classic statement, see Robbins (1963).) This argument recurs with great
frequency in official statements but amounts to special pleading for state
subsidy. The resources to support the arts for this reason alone could be used
to finance other activities that could produce the same result. The same
argument could be used to support a whole range of options from space
research to football teams. It will be noticed that interdependent utility
functions have been introduced as a way of tracking spillover benefits to non-
consumers of arts services. A more persuasive use of this familiar
modification to welfare economics is found in the concern expressed for
future generations who have no say in present decisions to preserve the arts
(see, for example, Baumol (1987) and Fullerton (1991)). I prefer an
interpretation of this position that avers that present generations derive
present utility from looking after the interests of their children and
grandchildren. In other words, my welfare is affected by the expectation that
future generations may disapprove of actions of mine that would deny them
the enjoyment from preserved art forms. One should note, however, that the
argument supposes that cultural resources that are destroyed cannot be re-
created, but this only seems plausible in the case of historical artefacts. Even
in this case, as with natural resources that are used up, new discoveries take
place, and at present, as already observed, there are thousands of
archaeological sites awaiting examination. One has to adopt an extreme
Ruskinian position to assert that all historical artefacts are unique and have an
inalienable right to be preserved. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that
future generations will approve of what we choose to preserve for them.
3.  Quality of choices. Traditional welfare economics rests on the assumption
that tastes and preferences are given. This neglects taking account of the fact
that individuals derive utility from investing in knowledge of the goods and
services available to them in order to improve their satisfaction, the arts being
a prominent example of this process. That such investment should be
encouraged must rest on a value judgement about the quality of choices.
Libertarians might argue that taste formation should be regarded purely as a
family responsibility in the case of minors, leaving them in adult life to invest
in self-education with a view to increasing their chances of individual
enjoyment. However, those who claim that education provides spillover
benefits to society will argue that cultural education is an integral part of theFiscal Studies
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educational process and that inequality of access to education would imply
that quality of choices would be impaired through under-investment. A more
direct argument for cultural education is provided by Scitovsky (1983). The
arts, he claims, can be presented in a form that rivals the excitement and
danger associated with violent behaviour amongst the young. Teaching ‘new
consumption skills’ that rely on artistic pursuits might ‘soothe the savage
breast’ and reduce the negative externalities by lowering the demand for the
excitements associated with criminality. Certainly, the sentiments expressed
in such arguments frequently appear in official pronouncements. For
example, recently the Davies Report provided in Annex 8 a lengthy
examination of market failure in broadcasting in which it is stated that
Television has the capacity either to restrict or expand knowledge, experience and
imagination of individuals. If television is provided via the free market, there is a
danger that consumers will under-invest in the development of their own tastes,
experience and capacity to comprehend because it is only in retrospect that the benefits
of such investment become apparent.
DCMS, 1999c.
As with the previous arguments, translating these arguments into a specific
amount and form of public support is not usually attempted in their
presentation and development.
4.  Trust the government rather than the market. The maxim of freedom of
choice must logically extend to choice over methods of choice themselves,
and a variety of reasons may be given why individuals may prefer a political
to a market solution in promotion of the arts. Individuals, while having
different preferences scales, may support community values which can only
be given expression in some form of collective action, national heritage being
quoted as an example (see, particularly, Musgrave (1987)). Commercially
operated theme parks may only partially fulfil any urge to derive utility from
identification with the past. They are there to provide entertainment, often
thereby creating a comfortable mythology, and have a very limited interest in
preserving historical artefacts. Hence the proposition that government should
support research designed to give a comprehensive account of our heritage
and that the public should assign to experts in art history, architecture and the
like the task of selecting the artefacts that should be brought to their attention.
The acceptance of this argument has wider implications which are examined
in Section V, but the question of trust has been instanced as an important
element in facilitating voluntary redistribution of cultural assets in order to
make them more widely available to the public. Even the most ruthless
captains of industry have been known to bequeath their historical artefacts to
state museums and galleries and to the National Trust rather than to private
institutions because it is considered that the former are more likely to abidePublic Financing of the Arts
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by agreements to preserve and maintain them. (Of course, the motive for
bequests may lie in the utility derived from preserving the family’s memory.)
The Museums and Galleries Act 1992 does permit the National Gallery, the
National Portrait Gallery and the Tate Gallery to overturn such agreements
after 50 years, but this has caused bitter controversy (see Goodison (1997)).
The merit goods position requires that choices are made by government
appointees who presumably are expected to have superior knowledge of
cultural benefits. These choices cannot be other than subjective — that is to
say, at best they are well-informed value judgements.
15 The logic of consumer
sovereignty therefore implies that consumers/taxpayers do not cease to be
rational economic agents but will expect those who act on their behalf to be
accountable to them through the political system. This is hardly a helpful
conclusion, for one is then forced to make a judgement as to whether the
political system is sufficiently sensitive to operate in a way analogous to the
competitive market. Rather than enter into an area embracing the more
recondite areas of constitutional economics, it seems more sensible to take
the political system as given and then to consider ways in which it might be
modified to offer some prospect that consumer satisfaction is being taken as
fully into account as possible.
While evidence has been presented here that those concerned with arts policy
justify what they are doing with reference to welfare economics terminology, if
only in incantatory form, the link forged between the public’s preferences and
the thrust of policy tends to be of a somewhat tenuous kind. The link tends to
become stronger when arts organisations perceive that they are under threat
because government subsidies and/or direct receipts from the public are not
considered sufficient to satisfy their aspirations. Indeed, whereas there is little
demand for economists as devisers of optimal subsidy arrangements for the arts,
there is a market for their services in a range of methods for measuring the
degree of public support for existing programmes, a subject best treated below
when methods of expenditure control are considered (see Section V).
A strong contrast can be observed between the forms of support suggested by
welfare economics and those that actually exist. If reliance is placed on the
doctrine of consumer sovereignty, then this would appear to point towards the
use of state financing (for example, through a voucher system or tax relief) rather
than state provision of arts ventures. Individuals would be encouraged to attend
artistic events and to enjoy heritage services according to a pattern determined
by themselves. This pattern will change according to their changing knowledge
and appreciation of the arts. Bureaucratic interference in the production of arts
services would be minimised, but companies would face more competition.
16 As
                                                                                                                                   
15For detailed consideration of this issue from the point of view of the art historian, see Gombrich (1979).
16I have discussed this more fully with reference to the UK in Peacock (1993, Chapter 7).Fiscal Studies
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already indicated, such a scenario has had little influence on methods of central
and local government support. Heritage services, performing arts companies and
state-funded museums and galleries provide services usually at well below cost
and the difference is made up by direct production subsidies. The BBC receives
a large part of its finance in the form of hypothecation of the licence fee.
The lack of correspondence between the prescriptions derived from welfare
economics and the widespread intervention of governments in arts provision is
the signal given to public choice economists, like the author, that attempts to
rectify market failure may be frustrated by ‘government failure’. It will at least
be agreed that the amount and form of public expenditure on the arts in the UK
will be characterised by discretionary behaviour on the part of government
officials and the subsidised bodies. This fact is the basis of the argument that
vested interests of producers are a dominant force in public management of the
arts.
V. IMPLEMENTING POLICIES (1):
THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
Those wedded to a public choice approach to public expenditure on the arts in a
normative sense would seek evidence for the degree of optimality in the
allocation of resources in the extent of public participation in the decision-
making process. It is for this reason that literature on cultural economics contains
several major studies of methods for ensuring such participation, notably in
countries where governments are obliged to respond to requests for
referendums.
17
Such pressures do not exist to anything like the same extent in our highly
centralised democracy. The ‘public interest’ is decided by the elected
government, whose degree of sensitivity to public opinion at any point in time
depends on its perceived relationship between such opinion and its tenure of
office. That relationship is a tenuous one in the case of arts expenditure both
because of its relatively small size and because of the narrow range of classes
that benefit directly from it. The exception is the BBC which, faced with
growing competition, has increased considerably its efforts to detect a close
connection between its programme making and consumer attitudes.
The present government is sensitive to the issue of public participation. In the
case of the DCMS, evidence of this is afforded by the large number of
appointments to quangos which should take account of public attitudes.
However, such persons are appointed to advise the funded bodies of the DCMS
on the implementation of existing policies and not to formulate policies
themselves. They are appointed and not elected by any constituency. They are
                                                                                                                                   
17Notably Switzerland, where Frey and Pommerehne (1989, Chapter 5) record that, of 1,701 referendums
conducted by Swiss municipalities between 1950 and 1983, no fewer than 108 concerned cultural matters.Public Financing of the Arts
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not a cross-section of the public, nor is that claimed to be the case. The majority
are recruited because of their knowledge of the art form in question — that is to
say, their interests are closely tied to those who receive public support. The
strongest argument in favour of this approach derived from our previous
discussion is that they can identify the appropriate ‘merit goods’ that the public
should learn to enjoy, if they do not already.
Trustees of NDPBs are under no formal obligation to act as a sounding board
for public opinion, which gives rise to the question of how one might devise
some forms of more direct public participation that does not depend on selection
by the DCMS. It would obviously be too complicated to devise constituencies of
voters for so many different bodies, as well as being very expensive to operate.
However, several major arts organisations — notably the National Trust, English
Heritage and large theatre, opera and orchestral companies — enlist subscribers
as ‘friends’, but in few cases are they assigned seats on the Board of
Management. Even with the National Trust, members have only limited powers
in the election of the governing body. A case could therefore be made for
insisting that publicly funded (either by grants or by tax reliefs on covenanted
income) institutions should give representation on the Board of Management to
subscribers, the representatives being elected by the subscribers themselves. Of
course, there could well be a tendency for subscribers to represent only a well-
heeled minority and that those willing to serve would be retired persons.
However, this might be better than nothing at all, and at least compatible with
other elements in a programme designed to combine public participation in and
appreciation of artistic ventures. For example, those buying Lottery tickets have
no direct say in the allocation of National Lottery proceeds to ‘good causes’, and
there is surely a case for polling punters so that preferences are taken much more
fully into account.
18 It would be within the spirit of the Lottery to allow punters
to let their names go forward to serve for a fixed period on the Lottery Board and
then to be chosen — by lot!
Of course, the general public do express their preferences for the arts through
the box-office in the performing arts and through entrance fees to museums,
galleries and historical buildings and sites. As already observed, in the case of
the performing arts alone, the grant-aided companies financed by the English
Arts Council have, in recent years, raised just over 50 per cent of their current
income from private sources (mainly box-office). The percentage for museums
and galleries as funded bodies has been much lower and the dispersion in the
percentage raised from admission fees and services much greater. The logic of
subsidisation would suggest that the percentage of revenue provided in grant
form should reflect the degree of market failure, but, apart from the formidable
problems of calculation, neither the DCMS nor the funded bodies seem prepared
to think in these terms. So far as the former is concerned, this can be explained
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by the emphasis in policy upon the expressed desire for ‘the promotion of access
for the many not just the few’ (see DCMS (1998, p. 3)), which adds an
additional term to the ‘social welfare function’ alongside efficient allocation
based on existing tastes and preferences. It is reflected in the long-term objective
of scrapping entrance charges to publicly funded museums and galleries, already
in operation for retired persons. The NDPBs can readily accept financial
arrangements that relieve the pressure on them to satisfy the general public by
competing for their custom. This enables them more readily to achieve other
objectives more congenial to their managers, such as the mounting of prestigious
exhibitions, the pursuit of research interests that conform with the canons of
their professional confrères and attendance at international conferences (see Frey
(1994)).
As an alternative approach to appraisal of the allocation of resources devoted
to the arts is to judge the DCMS by identifying its ‘utility function’ and tracing
its influence on the pattern of funding. There is little to add here to the
exposition in Section IV above, except to say that the basic document describing
aims and objects — A New Cultural Framework (DCMS, 1998) — was based on
wide consultation to which the producer interests responded enthusiastically (see
its Appendix). Inevitably, these aims and objects, as with many other major
departments of government, are set out in very general terms with no clear idea
of ‘trade-offs’ between ‘the promotion of access for the many and not just the
few’, ‘the pursuit of excellence and innovation’ and ‘the nurturing of educational
opportunity’. This avoids the necessity of having to justify the precise pattern of
funding and, indeed, although precise cash funding data are projected forward
over the three-year planning period to 2001–02 (subject to annual revision), it
comes as no surprise to find that no attempt is made, nor the necessity
recognised, to establish the nexus between objectives and the budget allocations
to the various funded bodies.
19
However, if the DCMS keeps its options open on funding allocations and
spends much of the space in the strategy document describing institutional
changes rather than policy desiderata, it commendably emphasises the
importance of improving the flow of information and the use of appraisal
methods that are designed to guarantee that the ‘DCMS ties its expenditure to its
objectives’ and that ‘public money is being used appropriately to meet public
objectives’. These represent major and necessary changes in an area of public
expenditure where there are particularly difficult problems in achieving
efficiency. These call for separate and extended treatment in the following
section.
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VI. IMPLEMENTING POLICIES (2):
EFFICIENCY IN SPENDING
In common with other government departments, the DCMS is subject to a series
of expenditure controls which appear to be rigorous and effective. However,
each department has its own particular difficulties in applying these controls and
the DCMS is no exception.
Consider first of all the standard controls:
•   As the data and information already presented indicate, expenditure plans for
the arts covered by the funded bodies of the DCMS are set out in
considerable detail within the framework of the annual Public Expenditure
Reviews and are submitted in the normal way for parliamentary approval. In
the author’s opinion, the Annual Reports of the DCMS, which convey this
information and data to the public, are very satisfactory.
•   There has been a growing insistence on the presentation of corporate plans by
both executive agencies, such as English Heritage, and national museums and
galleries.
20 These have to include performance indicators. Evidence of this is
to be found in the extraordinary case of the British Museum. The Edwards
Report on the Museum (see Edwards (1996)) noted, alongside some trenchant
criticism of its management, that until 1996 the British Museum published
neither an annual report nor a corporate plan. The bringing together of the
funded bodies under the aegis of the DCMS has changed all that and now it
must provide both. However, how such targets and indicators are chosen, who
is to approve them and whether they are sensible in themselves is a separate,
important matter and merits much further discussion (see below).
•   The DCMS co-operates fully in the promotion of Treasury ‘best-practice’
methods in economic appraisal of major investment projects and in
minimising input costs through the use of competitive tendering. Cost–benefit
analysis (CBA) is extensively used, particularly in preservation and
restoration work of historic buildings, but presents difficult problems in
application, notably in the evaluation of benefits. Many heritage projects are
justified in terms of intangible benefits, including those accruing to future
generations, and where benefits to individuals are traceable, the price charged
(in many cases zero) may not reflect these benefits. This accounts for the
proliferation of evaluation procedures based on ‘willingness to pay’, notably
the use of contingent valuation (CV). CV has been highlighted as of
particular importance in the case of evaluating the contribution of historical
artefacts to welfare because asking individuals to state the maximum that they
are willing to pay to preserve some historical object may capture estimates of
its so-called ‘non-use value’. (For further discussion, see Portney (1994).)
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Individuals can then express any benefits that they derive from option
demand and bequest values (see Section IV). The strong support for this
method by architects and surveyors and by such bodies as English Heritage
(see Allison et al. (1996)) is in contrast to the criticisms of its methodology as
highlighted in the example given later in this section. Nevertheless, the
growing acceptance of sensible methods of appraisal is a notable
development, although it is one thing to detect agreement amongst economic
analysts on procedures and another to ensure their acceptance by those
affected by the conclusions, upon whom access to information may depend.
•   The accounts of the funded bodies are open to inspection to the National
Audit Commission, which may not only comment on its findings but also
undertake ad hoc studies of the efficiency of their operations. These reports
are meat and drink to the House of Commons Committee on Culture, Media
and Sport, which can summon the chairs of such bodies and their officials to
explain and justify their actions. This Committee, under the chairmanship of
Gerald Kaufman, has been noticeably active, a striking example being its
strong criticism of the financial administration of the Royal Opera at Covent
Garden. In addition, the Committee on Public Accounts has the specific task
of reporting to Parliament on ‘value for money’ matters and has revealed that,
at present, it has no access to the BBC in order to ascertain how it uses the
licence fee. The Davies Committee has accepted this point and recommended
that the National Audit Office (NAO) should have access to the BBC’s
accounts, requiring an amendment to its Royal Charter.
21
The above controls are clearly a necessary part of any planning and
monitoring process designed to ensure that budgeting is properly carried out, but
expenditure policy assumes that an attempt is being made to keep the costs of
‘output’ of arts services to a minimum. However, the opportunities for
discretionary behaviour open to arts organisations present a major problem in
fulfilling this condition.
This problem can be illustrated in a number of ways. A useful starting-point
is the analysis of the effects of an output subsidy on a single firm, which has
been used to establish the proposition that a per-unit-of-output subsidy will
increase output in the case of both a profit-making firm and a non-profit-making
firm with identical production functions, but, for a given amount of subsidy,
more output will be achieved by the latter. This is because the profit-making firm
will only increase output to the extent that it maximises profits. If the policy
objective is to minimise the amount of subsidy to produce a given output, then
subsidy should only be given to the non-profit-making firm. This has been used
as an argument for discriminating in favour of arts organisations that are
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registered as charities. (For further analysis, see Throsby and Withers (1979),
West (1987) and comment by Peacock (1998).) Those who have advanced this
argument are well aware that any approximation to reality involves further
investigation of the relationship between the funding body and the firm. Unless
that body can conduct some franchising arrangement which induces competitive
tenders that reveal costs, a classic principal–agent situation arises with
asymmetric information. That situation is no longer one of constrained
maximisation by the firm but one of bargaining. Well-established national arts
institutions are clearly in this position, though it is conceivable that a bidding
process of the kind applied in the case of operation of the National Lottery could
be applied to the management of museums and galleries. Nevertheless, the
DCMS would still have to rely on the ‘firm’ itself for information on its costs,
and close scrutiny of such costs is in itself a costly procedure. As West (1987)
has put it, there is an ‘implicit assumption of zero interdependence between the
granting of the subsidy and reported costs’. There is therefore no guarantee that
the response to a unit subsidy would be a movement along a minimum marginal
cost curve, for the opportunity exists to accumulate rents by disguising them as
costs. Of course, any such suggestion would be strongly denied by the subsidised
firm. The case is usually associated with situations where there is a proposal to
limit costs, in which case it is invariably claimed that any reduction in subsidy
will lower the quality of output. This is certainly the argument used by the BBC
in questioning the tying of the licence fee to a consumer price index (see DCMS
(1999c, passim)).
The drawing up of a contract faces the further difficulty that, in the case of
NDPBs, they present themselves as multi-product firms whose ‘outputs’ are
difficult to define. The convention has developed that ‘performance indicators’
(PIs) should be used to monitor their activities. Whereas in a profit-making
enterprise the assessment of the value of each product will be based on the
relation between marginal cost and marginal revenue (subject to constraints
reflecting objectives other than profit maximisation), the perceived importance
of externalities in the case of the arts and the limited use of prices as indicators
of consumer satisfaction mean that trade-offs require the institution of some
weighting system. Moreover, the implicit acceptance by the DCMS of the merit-
goods argument means that PIs should reflect the preferences of the cognoscenti
who advise it and not simply the satisfaction derived directly from NDPB
services enjoyed by the public. In short, the choice of PIs and their relative
weighting reflects an interesting bargaining process between the DCMS and
individual NDPBs.
22 That considerable progress has been made in gaining
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acceptance of PIs is evident in the presentation of PIs for the directly funded
NDPBs in the most recent DCMS Annual Reports, which cover targets as well as
revealing past trends (see, for example, DCMS (1999a, Section II)).
It is beyond the scope of this paper to offer a detailed critique of the PI
system, but some brief conclusions can be drawn from the published data:
•   The general method for measuring consumer demand is to index the number
of visits by individuals or organised parties. It has been claimed that these
data tend to be exaggerated in the case of NDPBs that do not charge for
admittance (see footnote 11). It is noteworthy that those NDPBs that charge
for admission follow up with records of ‘visitor satisfaction’ which refine the
crudity of the basic measure.
•   Trade-offs are not recorded and there would be, in any case, some difficulty
in knowing how to trade off those PIs that, broadly speaking, refer to
consumer satisfaction and those that record movements in inputs. The British
Museum, for example, offers the conventional PI of number of visits per
annum, actual and projected forward to 2001–02, along with a PI recording
the number of ‘objects loaned’ and ‘percentage of storage areas which are
satisfactory’. Similarly, the National Gallery offers ‘no. of rooms refurbished
since 1987’ alongside an index of number of visits. In the case of the last-
named PI, the number of visits could only be estimated (see footnote 11).
•   PIs that purport to display movements in output are not by themselves
measures of efficiency. As a minimum, one requires data of inputs per unit of
output and a reasonable degree of homogeneity in the units of each measure.
For example, the National Portrait Gallery entry in the DCMS Annual
Reports tracks the annual grant-in-aid per visitor, which is fairly constant
through time (1993–94 to 2001–02 (estimated)), but this is an exception at
this level of presentation of information. Several NDPBs emphasise their
attempts to improve the percentage of revenue raised from sources
independent of government as a measure of efficiency.
It would be easy to conclude that the bargaining process regarding the choice
of PIs makes it difficult to believe that the DCMS is able to minimise
discretionary behaviour amongst NDPBs. In particular, any attempt to measure
comparative efficiency must be frustrated by the free-for-all manifested in the
choice of PIs. Nevertheless, anyone who, like the author, can look back thirty
years or so is bound to admit that the information flow from arts organisations
funded by government has improved beyond recognition.Public Financing of the Arts
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VII. THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC SPENDING ON THE ARTS
1. The Performing Arts
One of the most influential propositions concerning the performing arts emanates
from the identification of a ‘cost disease’ which is alleged to be endemic in the
performing arts, from which the conclusion has been drawn that their long-term
survival depends on ever-growing amounts of public subsidy. The locus
classicus of this proposition is the pioneer work of Baumol and Bowen which
appeared in 1966.
23
The ‘disease’ is ‘caught’ because personal services are an integral part of the
provision of output and this limits the introduction of technology associated with
changes in the input-mix which could improve the productivity of labour. No
offsetting reduction in the relative cost of labour is possible because competition
in labour markets offers alternative opportunities, in the longer run, for those
with the capacity to become performing artists. It follows that, as an economy
grows and real wages increase, increases in costs in manufacturing output, where
technological innovation can take place, are offset by increases in productivity
per head through process innovation, whereas relative costs will rise in the
‘unproductive’ performing arts sector. Of course, if the income elasticity of
demand for performing arts rises, the orchestras and theatre and opera companies
may be able to survive, but even this assumption has been questioned by the
introduction of the ‘Linder effect’ (see Linder (1970)). This requires that, as the
economy grows and output per head rises, the price of time rises, implying that
there is an offsetting reduction in demand for those goods and services where
time is an important input, such as the performing arts. A favourite example of
Baumol is the Purcell opera Dido and Aeneas, which requires as many singers
and orchestral performers to produce the same product today as in 1680 when it
first appeared. One might add that the time input cannot be reduced by
performing it at twice the speed, for that would destroy the product!
Baumol and his collaborators (see Towse (1997a)) have always been careful
not to state a position on the question of public subsidy. Moreover, they have
taken on themselves the responsibility of testing their propositions by detailed
statistical enquiry and have offered a doughty defence against criticisms.
Nevertheless, the identification of the ‘Baumol disease’ has, from time to time,
offered a heaven-sent opportunity for performing arts companies to demand
progressive increases in subsidy, notably in the 1970s when the acceleration in
the rate of inflation led them to draw the inference that cost inflation was having
an unfavourable differential effect on the performing arts. The Arts Council of
Great Britain sought and expected detailed confirmation of this assertion in the
report on Inflation and the Performed Arts which the author was asked to
undertake together with Eddie Shoesmith and Geoffrey Milner (see Peacock et
                                                                                                                                   
23For a full account of their work and Baumol’s subsequent development of it, see Towse (1997a).Fiscal Studies
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al. (1983)). To its obvious disappointment, the report offered no evidence of a
Baumol effect on the cost side. Unfortunately, the Arts Council did not learn
from this experience and conveyed the impression in later economic studies
commissioned by it that it expected economists to act as hired guns (for further
observations on this matter, see Peacock (1993)). Nevertheless, this is not to
dismiss the Baumol disease as a health scare, and there are aspects of the
Baumol thesis that shed an important light on future relations between the
performing arts and state funding authorities.
The question to be asked is why the large majority of the major performing
arts companies have survived over the last four decades. Baumol’s hypothesis
emphasises the limited possibilities of substituting capital embodying new
technologies for labour but does not preclude reductions in the magnitude of
total inputs without altering the relative factor proportions consistent with the
attraction of the end product. The commercial theatre has survived because new
plays and shows are demanded by the public and this offers the opportunity of
diminishing the size of casts down to the ultimate stage of the one-person show
(for elaboration of this argument, see Peacock, Shoesmith and Milner (1983, pp.
43–4)). The problem with orchestras and operas is the relative inflexibility in the
repertoire caused by the preferences of audiences for 19
th Century music, which
requires large forces which cannot be reduced in size without a perceived fall in
the quality of performance.
The Arts Councils have been placed in a dilemma by the perceived
difficulties of factor substitution and the inflexibility of the repertoire. For many
years, they have sought to persuade the nine London and regional orchestras in
receipt of grant to raise about half their income from box-office and
engagements. However, rising relative costs of labour illustrating the Baumol
effect have resulted in periodic accumulation of large deficits, reducing some
regional orchestras to a position of near-bankruptcy, despite determined efforts
by some of them to survive by ‘down-market’ concerts of popular music,
including jazz and rock, and by seeking recordings and broadcasting
engagements in what has become a highly competitive market. While the Arts
Councils tended in the past to adopt a Micawber-like strategy of waiting for
funding to turn up as a result of public protests at orchestral ‘underfunding’, and
then to bale out orchestras at the eleventh hour, the stark realities of projected
funding have forced them to recognise that radical changes may be needed in
orchestral management, and of the sort that the author advocated nearly thirty
years ago (see Arts Council of Great Britain (1970) — ‘Peacock’ Report). It was
announced in October 1999 that, in return for wiping the deficit slate clean and
providing a ‘sound’ financial footing for all orchestras, orchestras would have to
introduce much more flexible contracting arrangements with players, which
would increase the prospects of tackling a more extensive repertoire, and
increase efforts at educational work (see Arts Council of England (1999)). But,
in keeping with a long tradition, the required changes will only be instituted byPublic Financing of the Arts
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negotiation and agreement. It will be interesting to observe whether Baumol’s
disease can at least be controlled by these radical therapies, assuming that they
are put into effect.
2. ‘Sustainable’ Heritage
A problem of growing concern in funding the arts must be having to square the
growth in official inventories of heritage artefacts, whether movable or
immovable, designed to identify what is worth preserving and restoring, with the
resources likely to be available to do so. These inventories are compiled largely
on the advice of art historians and archaeologists (see Benhamou (1998),
comparing Britain and France), whose approach is nothing if not thorough. Their
listing of everything from pebbles to palaces has a parallel with that adopted by
environmentalists concerned about the possible demise of every species of
beetle.
The practical purpose of these inventories must be to establish where the cut-
off point is to be placed between what is to be preserved and restored and what is
not, at least in respect of public funding. Co-operation to establish this point is
understandably difficult to obtain. First, there is bound to be professional
disagreement about orders of priority as between buildings and movable
artefacts, between historical periods and between art forms. This encourages a
refusal to recognise the existence of an opportunity-cost problem with respect to
alternative ways of supporting the arts. The less resource constraints are brought
into the argument, the less the need to reveal these disagreements which
undermine the authority of the arbiters of taste. Second, arbiters of taste are not
only advisers to the DCMS, as members of the various quangos under its
umbrella, but also frequently managers of the various outlets for public
presentation of heritage. Not being answerable to the general public through
having to ‘sell’ their product, they have a comparative advantage in making their
case for moving the cut-off point as far down the list as possible, with the
extreme position taken by those who appear to believe that all identifiable
artefacts have an inalienable right to preservation. Third, the funding
conventions make it much easier for managers-cum-experts to maximise a
personal welfare function in which reputation with one’s peer group is an
important argument — as with university professors! This is because not only
the additions to the heritage stock but also the stock itself fall within their
control.
This is not to question the integrity of managers, who may reasonably claim
that reputation with their peer group ensures the standards of heritage
preservation that promote the public interest and that they believe the public,
with their guidance, can learn to appreciate as merit wants. However, it leads to
some questionable practices. The first is implicitly to reject the possibility that
the public will ever move away from being passive adjusters to heritage servicesFiscal Studies
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to becoming knowledgeable enough to demand a direct say in what is presented
to them. The second is the refusal to accept that the non-material values that
dominate their choice of artefacts to be acquired must be conditioned by the
material base that supports them. Acquisitions must be allowed to accumulate
indefinitely, even if it means, as is commonly found, that the ratio of artefacts on
display to the total stock reaches 1:4 (see Frey (1994)). If this is rationalised by
the proposition that this reflects the proper balance between what the public is to
enjoy and what represents archival material for scholarly research, then an
important issue of cultural policy is revealed. Third, these very research interests
are not necessarily even closely related to the objective of preserving national
heritage. A large part of our national collections maintained at public expense
consist of paintings, sculptures etc. of a large variety of European Schools, and
certainly have an educative value, but it is a moot point whether heritage funds
should be used to acquire them. Moreover, the major national galleries are
becoming vast storehouses of lesser-known paintings and other artefacts which
no doubt cater for the more esoteric interests of scholars chasing new lines of
artistic enquiry but do not necessarily add to the enjoyment and understanding of
those who have to provide the resources to maintain them.
A situation where the growth in the historical artefacts designed to reflect
heritage policy will depend on such uncertainties as the artistic fashions, the
state of the weather and the incidence of private sales of ‘masterpieces’ in
dealers’ catalogues cannot be sustained for much longer. There are already
indications of this in the debate now centred on whether museums and galleries
should be allowed to ‘de-accession’ artefacts with the proviso that the proceeds
of sale should be used to alter the balance in the ‘portfolio’ of artefacts to reflect
policy guidelines. (For an account of this debate, see Elliot (1998).) The
prediction may be hazarded that those guidelines will soon have to move towards
the articulation of a ‘sustainable heritage’, offering an interesting parallel to
attempts to devise a ‘sustainable’ natural environment. (For further discussion,
see Getty Conservation Institute (1999), Throsby (1997) and Peacock (1997).)
3. Broadcasting and the Arts
In the course of two decades, the standard arguments for vertical integration of
broadcasting production, the restriction of access to broadcasting services and
the limitations on charging directly for such services have had to undergo drastic
modification. Confining discussion to the influence of technological progress
alone, spectrum scarcity has disappeared, modes of delivery of TV signals are no
longer confined to terrestrial transmission and charging systems such as
subscription and pay-per-view even permit the exercise of active choice by
viewers and listeners through two-way transmission (for example, in choosing
between alternative programmes offered by one channel) and through the
personal rescheduling of programmes by the use of the VCR. If the purpose ofPublic Financing of the Arts
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broadcasting is to satisfy the tastes and preferences of viewers and listeners, then
familiar economic analysis would offer workable competition as the appropriate
policy model, and this seems achievable. However, this model would not
preclude government intervention, where possible, to prevent anti-competitive
practices, to exercise censorship to the degree sanctioned by public opinion and
to offer public funding for cultural and educational projects supported by
‘market failure’ arguments. (For a rehearsal of these arguments, see Home Office
(1986) — the Peacock Report — and DCMS (1999c, passim) — the Davies
Report.)
Changes in public policy over the last fifteen years indicate the degree to
which successive governments have had to accept the ‘consumer sovereignty
scenario’. The result has been that attention has now to be focused on defining
the role of the government in influencing the content of programming which, in
this context, means the use of broadcasting as a medium for improving access to
the arts. A major part of the BBC’s case for seeking a supplement to its licence
fee for the development of digital services is based on its role ‘to improve access
to  British culture and creativity, particularly for the many who can afford
neither pay-per-view nor even ticket prices’ (bold type in original).
24 Taking this
assertion at its face value, one can certainly make a strong case for the BBC as
having a leading role in encouraging private investment in cultural goods, not
only through the stimulus of arts programmes as such but also in drawing
attention to artistic events in general, including live productions in particular.
25
However, our general argument would not support a case for assigning public
funding to the exclusive use of the BBC. As it is, independent TV companies
only receive their franchises on the assumption that they continue to produce
public service programmes. The BBC may be right in assuming that the
commercial sector will be forced ‘down market’ because of intense competition,
but this does not make the case for conferring a cultural monopoly on the BBC
buttressed by the licence fee. No such monopoly is assured in the case of the live
arts, where competition between companies and between museums and galleries
could be regarded as an important stimulus to creativity. A consistent policy in
the field of broadcasting suggests that independent companies should be able to
compete with the BBC for government funding for public service programming
of this nature, and indeed for public service programming in general. If the
licence fee were used for this purpose, this would entail the privatisation of the
BBC, though not necessarily its transformation into a purely commercial
concern.
26 The likelihood that logic will govern the future provision of public
                                                                                                                                   
24See the BBC’s (1999) response to the DCMS on the Davies Committee Report.
25This ignores the interminable argument about whether TV productions are substitutes to or complements of
live ones.
26I admit that this is a ‘plug’ for the long-term recommendations of the Home Office (1986) Report of the
Committee on Financing the BBC which was chaired by the author!Fiscal Studies
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service broadcasting can certainly not be taken for granted, and the BBC will
remain a protected species at least until the review of its Charter in 2005.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Government expenditure on the arts, including heritage and cultural
programming in broadcasting, is ‘peanuts’ alongside the vast ‘empires’ of
expenditure represented by defence, law and order, health, and education, but it
may fairly be claimed that the ‘DCMS and its sponsored bodies have more to do
with people’s enjoyment of life than any other Government department’ (DCMS,
1998, p. 4). It is therefore not altogether surprising to find that the DCMS, in
collaboration with other government departments and the Treasury, influences
the arts and heritage through instruments other than public funding, notably
through tax concessions, regulation of conservation and disposal of historical
artefacts, and copyright law (see Section II). The relative importance of this mix
of measures will vary from time to time and from country to country, making
international comparisons of government support for the arts very difficult
indeed (see Section III).
A second feature of this study is the attention drawn to the analytics of
cultural economics, which has only recently risen to the heights of separate
classification (‘Z’) in the bibliography of the Journal of Economic Literature. As
a study of the provision of services, the economic analysis employed can be
familiar, but there are two distinctive features in its use. The first is the emphasis
placed on the dynamics of the preference structure which derives from
investment in enjoyment of the arts and which implies that improving the quality
of choices should be a matter of public concern (see Section IV). This is not an
issue that can be handled very readily in traditional welfare economics. The
second is that cultural economics adds an interesting dimension to the
development of principal–agent and bargaining models because it is concerned
with the interface between the funding bodies and arts organisations which are
typically non-profit-making (see particularly Section VI).
A final feature concerns the particular difficulties that a department such as
the DCMS faces in developing techniques that are a substitute for market forces
and that ensure proper and efficient use of public money. The fundamental
problem is one of relating the aspiration of the DCMS to increase access to the
grant-aided arts and heritage organisations to the latter’s strong interest in
promoting activities that satisfy the peer-group assessment of their managers and
advisers (see Sections VI and VII) as to what is in ‘the public interest’. This
aspiration, if it has anything to do with taxpayer/voter interest in the arts, could
logically entail a major shifting of funds between art forms, such as preventing
the ‘top-slicing’ of the arts budgets by entrenched ‘national’ companies,
museums and galleries and encouraging art forms that more directly involve
those who are supposed to benefit from them. A compromise is likely to be thePublic Financing of the Arts
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result, with the DCMS placing conditions on the funding of powerful incumbents
so that they demonstrate a concern for popularising their activities without
reducing their standards. The DCMS has begun in the right place by instituting a
formidable and welcome change in the flow of relevant information available to
the public and by developing and applying methods of economic appraisal to
expenditure proposals which must entail necessary adjustments in the
perspective of arts managers. Economists who contend that funding bodies
supporting activities as prestigious and elusive as the arts inevitably finish up as
‘captives’ may watch progress with considerable interest!
REFERENCES
Allison, G., Ball, S., Cheshire, P., Evans, A. and Stabler, M. (1996), The Value of Conservation: A
Literature Review of the Economic and Social Value of the Cultural Built Heritage, London:
Department of National Heritage, English Heritage and Royal Institution of Chartered
Surveyors.
Arts Council of England (1998), Annual Report, London.
— (1999), Press Report, 13 October 1999, London.
Arts Council of Great Britain (1970), A Report on Orchestral Resources in Great Britain,
Chairman: A. T. Peacock.
Baumol, W. J. (1987), ‘Performing arts’, in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds), The New
Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, vol. 3, London: Macmillan Press.
— and Bowen, W. G. (1966), Performing Arts: The Economic Dilemma, New York: Twentieth
Century Fund.
Benhamou, F. (1998), ‘The evolution of heritage policies’, in A. T. Peacock (ed.), Does the Past
Have a Future?, Readings no. 47, London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
BBC (1999), The Future Funding of the BBC, Press Report on Davies Committee, London: British
Broadcasting Corporation.
Department of Culture, Media and Sport (1998), A New Cultural Framework, London: DCMS.
— (1999a), Annual Report, London: DCMS.
— (1999b), Efficiency and Effectiveness of Government-Sponsored Museums and Galleries,
prepared by Deloitte and Touche, London: DCMS.
— (1999c), The Future Funding of the BBC, Report of the Independent Review Panel, Chairman:
Gavyn Davies, London: DCMS.
Edwards, A. (1996), The British Museum: A Fundamental Review of the Museum’s Operations,
London: British Museum.
Elliot, G. (1998), ‘Museums and galleries: storehouses of value?’, in A. T. Peacock (ed.), Does the
Past Have a Future?, Readings no. 47, London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
Feist, A. (1998), ‘Comparing the performing arts in Britain, the US and Germany: making the most
of secondary data’, Cultural Trends, issue 31, pp. 29–48.
—, Fisher, R., Gordon, C. and Morgain, C. with O’Brien, J. (1998), International Data on Public
Spending on the Arts, Research Paper no. 13, London: Arts Council of England.
Frey, B. (1994), ‘Cultural economics and museum behaviour’, Scottish Journal of Political
Economy, vol. 41, pp. 325–35.Fiscal Studies
204
— and Pommerehne, W. (1989), Muses & Markets: Explorations in the Economics of the Arts,
Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Fullerton, D. (1991), ‘On public justifications for public support of the arts’, Journal of Cultural
Economics, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 67–82.
Getty Conservation Institute (1999), Economics and Heritage Conservation, Los Angeles: Getty
Institute.
Glasgow, M. (1975), ‘The concept of the Arts Council’, in M. Keynes (ed.), Essays on John
Maynard Keynes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Gombrich, E. (1979), ‘Art history and the social sciences’, Ideals and Idols, London: Phaidon
Press.
Goodison, N. (1997), ‘Wishes that must be respected’, Quarterly, London: National Arts
Collection Fund.
HM Treasury (1999), Public Expenditure Overview: Statistical Analysis 1999/2000, Cm. 4301,
London.
Home Office (1986), Report of the Committee on Financing the BBC, Chairman: Alan Peacock,
London: HMSO.
King, K. and Blaug, M. (1976), ‘Does the Arts Council know what it is doing?’, in M. Blaug (ed.),
The Economics of the Arts, London: Martin Robertson.
Linder, S. (1970), The Harried Leisure Class, New York: Columbia University Press.
London Economics (1997), New and Alternative Mechanisms for the Financing of the Arts,
Research Report no. 12, London: Arts Council of England.
MacQueen, H. and Peacock, A. T. (1995), ‘Implementing performance rights’, Journal of Cultural
Economics, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 157–75.
Musgrave, R. A. (1987), ‘Merit goods’, in J. Eatwell, M. Milgate and P. Newman (eds), The New
Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, vol. 3, London: Macmillan Press.
Peacock, A. T. (1993),  Paying the Piper: Culture, Music and Money, Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press.
— (1994), ‘A future for the past: the political economy of heritage’, British Academy Keynes
Lecture with Discussion, in Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 87, pp. 187–243.
— (1995), ‘Roll up for a National Lottery poll’, Financial Times, 10 July.
— (1997), ‘Towards a workable heritage policy’, in M. Hutter and I. Rizzo (eds), Economic
Perspectives on Heritage, London: Macmillan.
— (1998), ‘Subsidization and promotion of the arts’, in H. Giersch (ed.), Merits and Limits of
Markets, Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
— and Godfrey, C. (1972), ‘Cultural accounting’, Social Trends, no. 3, pp. 61–5.
—, Shoesmith, E. and Milner, G. (1983), Inflation and the Performed Arts, London: Arts Council
of Great Britain.
Portney, P. R. (1994), ‘The contingent valuation debate: why economists should care’, Journal of
Economic Perspectives, vol. 8, no. 4, pp. 3–17.
Robbins, L. C. (1963), ‘Art and the state’, in his Politics and Economics, London: Macmillan.
Sawers, D. (1998), ‘The National Trust: the private provision of heritage services’, in A. T.
Peacock (ed.), Does the Past Have a Future?, Readings no. 47, London: Institute of Economic
Affairs.
Scitovsky, T. (1983), ‘Subsidies for the arts: the economic argument’, in W. S. Hendon and J. L.
Shanahan (eds), Economics of Cultural Decisions, Cambridge, MA: Abt Books.Public Financing of the Arts
205
Solow, J. L. (1998), ‘An economic analysis of droit de suite’, Journal of Cultural Economics, vol.
22, no. 4, pp. 209–26.
Throsby, C. D. (1997), ‘Some questions in the economics of cultural heritage’, in M. Hutter and I.
Rizzo (eds), Economic Perspectives on Cultural Heritage, London: Macmillan.
— and Withers, G. A. (1979), Economics of the Performing Arts, London: Edward Arnold.
Towse, R. (1994), ‘Achieving public policy objectives in the arts and heritage’, in A. T. Peacock
and I. Rizzo (eds), Cultural Economics and Cultural Policies, Dordrecht: Kluwer.
— (ed.) (1997a), Baumol’s Cost Disease: The Arts and Other Victims, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
— (1997b), ‘Copyright as an economic incentive’, Hume Papers on Public Policy, vol. 5, no. 3,
pp. 32–45.
West, E. G. (1987), ‘Non-profit v profit firms in the performing arts’, Journal of Cultural
Economics, vol. 11, no. 2, pp. 37–47.